

[illegible][illegible]

to be inferred from this? It would be utterly vain to do so the policy of what England would have to do if France were to dash at the Rhine, and occupy Belgium, or attack Germany, because to man in his senses can think that the Emperor of the French can be excited by anxious to get Prussia and his hands. If he be at him while he has the will of course defend himself, and will not be without allies. I imagine; but, that he should intend to attack them is an idle dream. There it is, you ought to see France on the one hand, and the House of Austria on the other; and on this ground I should ask—Are you willing to guarantee, with your blood and money, to belligerent Austria the privileges of neutrality for her non-Italian provinces in war for the purpose of enabling Austria from such military aid to proceed consistently with the law of nations, her antagonists may think fit to direct against her without Italy? If you are not prepared to do this (as I trust you are not), well, then, do not resort to the practical vague declarations, but let us clearly understood by the Government, that whether the battle-field be confined to the Po, or extend to any other portion of the Austrian dominions, you wish England to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, and that you will not tolerate any proxy of subsidy, and that you will not drop the English flag, and the safety of Austria in the Adriatic, the Danube, or on the Cheers, as you would do it for her safety on the Po. (Cheers.) I think it both urgent and important, my Lord Mayor, that public opinion should be explicit in this manifesto, because I cannot forgo to say that the Mayor of London, and I, for the Government hinted at the possibility of England flying to the rescue of Austria, if she were to be attacked in the Adriatic. (Hear, hear.) And I ask you is that Austria to you, that she should be hanged to the protecting boom of Britannia, at the cost of your blood to be shed in the defence of Austria? I think that a hundred of millions at the cost of bringing incalculable confusion into your commercial relations, inflicting deep wounds, it may be irreparable wounds, on your property, checking your progress, and arresting the course of your peaceful reforms! "Hear, hear," and cheers. What, I ask again, what is the House of Austria to you? Is it a matter of course to you, that you should be engaged to your commercial interests? Why, just consult the latest returns of the Board of Trade, and you will see that your commerce with small but free Belgium is nearly six times as extensive as your commerce with the big Austrian empire. (Hear, hear.) And may I say that the big Austria, and the little Prussia, and the little Greece, rank each before Austria. But I know that when the heterogeneous compound of that European nuisance is once dissolved, your commercial intercourse with Hungary alone must be ten times as extensive as it is with the whole Austrian empire now. Or is it true, as some have told you, that you are engaged to Austria, because she is a great power? (Laughter.) Useful, indeed! I know that Austria was the insatiable plunderer of England; that she was the bottomless sack into which England poured millions from the life-sweat of her industrious people. I know that in the late French war you gave her the little smug of a hundred millions of pounds of money, and that Austria gave you got from her, I return, that is not yet recorded in history! (Laughter.) I know that you have saved Austria, but do not know that you are indebted for your safety, for your rank among the nations, for your prosperity, or for your freedom to her. (Cheers.) A really useful speech, my Lord Mayor. But how? You say, "useful, I have to say to learn. Austria, you say, is really faithful and true!" Why, gentlemen, remember the Crimean war! Cast your eyes at the gloomy churchyard held before Sevastopol. It is faithful Austria, that pale phantom of death, that sent you millions to die in vain on that fatal field! And why, I ask, did you not shoot, without raising a finger, in return for all your consideration for her. (Hear, hear.) But if I can find no answer to the question, "What is Austria to England?" I could tell you a tale of horrors about what Austria is to the great brightlight of mankind—liberty, which she has been the cause of, and enlightenment, what she is to everything that good men prize. No, England cannot, England will not, lead herself with the reproach of oppressed millions by stepping between Austria and retribution, for which she appears to be marked by the finger of a long-forbearing but just God. And why, I ask, why should England plunge into the calumny of war to keep that Austria safe? One answer is given to this question, which brings me to the last chapter of my remarks. It is said that the integrity of the Austrian Empire is necessary to the world, as it is, that cannot stand the light of common-sense, this word in terrible Moloch, to which right, justice, political morality, freedom, and the existence of nations have been immolated as so many holocausts. (Hear, hear.) Let it not be said that England persisted in perpetuating the sacrifice of the fallacies of this doctrine, that of the old Syrians, created the diseases which it intended to cure. I shall restrict myself to one remark of a practical character. Artificial States, without either organic cohesion or harmonizing cement, are an indictment to war, instead of conferring cement upon it. And what kind of a kind of a prepossession of the Austrian Empire meant to constitute a barrier? Evidently either against Russia or against France. Well, as to Russia. There are in the Austrian Empire seventeen millions of people belonging to the Slavonic race, and as to Russia, I have said, "use your eyes, and you will see that Russia is a national existence. Now, imagine Russia desiring to strike an ambitious blow anywhere. Will Austria be a barrier to her? Was she ever a barrier at any single moment of the past? Why, Russia need not say to the Czar, Alexander instructed Admiral Toka, "Ye seventeen millions rise against the oppressor of 'your nationality—here I am to help you, and they will rise; and where will Austria be? This is the reason why Austria did not dare draw her sword in the late Crimean war. Is that a barrier?" (Hear, hear.) (Cheers.) Now reverse the picture. Let those seventeen millions be delivered from the Austrian yoke, and they would be what Slavonic Poland was left quattered with the concurrence of Austria. Again, as to France. On the 15th November last I spoke at Glasgow, following words: "I say, my friends, that the world will stand at the side of Austria on the other France, than to be able to see 'frontiers of any of the nationalities oppressed by 'Austria and say, 'Here I am to help you, rise and throw off the yoke of Austria, and you will see 'the people will rise.' (On a just view of the eye of seeing this anticipation realized in Italy. As the French advance you may see in them new Decalogs raising up an armed foe to Austria from every stone. And you may see the anticipation by-and-by realized in other quarters too. If Austria held not the sword of Damocles suspended over the settled condition of Europe; it is the cavern from which the European volcano is fed." (Hear, hear, and cheers.) Let Austria vanish into the gulf of eternal perdition, and the world will stand at the side of Austria, and see the birth of great revolutions, but they will remain mere domestic affairs; European wars of ambition will become forever impossible, and you will not see any longer the life-sweat of Europe drained by the keeping up of large standing armies, because the responsibility of nations will be taken up and guarantee in independence of all. (Cheers.) The truth is very plain, my Lord. The nations agglomerated into the artificial compound called Austria certainly contain considerable elements of power, but it is a very great misconception to deduce from this not the inference that the Austrian Empire should be preserved, but of the necessity of the world to the balance of power. (Hear.) The world has progressed, my Lord. The sentiment of nationality which fifty years ago the dynasties aroused for the protection of their throne is strongly developed everywhere. If it is not so in England, it is equally strong in the Italian, Hungarian, and Slavonic nations. I may say, even stronger, because these are subject to foreign domination. Therefore the fact is, that the nations which are yoked together under the strictly military rule of Austria detest that rule. Consequently, in any war waged against Austria, one or another of them, it may be all of them, will always be sure to be at the side of the oppressed Austria. Those nations emancipated from the yoke of Austria, would certainly form powerful bulwarks of Europe's independence, but coupled together by force and violence in an unnatural compound which they detest, they are not a barrier, but the vulnerable point of Europe's peace and security. (Hear, hear.) I have said, my Lord Mayor, to elucidate the four points which I beg the meeting well to consider, because it is on the view which the English nation shall take of these points, that the policy of England will eventually depend. (Hear, hear.) There is one point more to be considered, and that is, what will be the result, if the other nationalities whom Austria holds in bondage, would act alone, England would not feel tempted to intervene, but the French intervention alters the case. (Hear, hear.) It is said that the Emperor of the French cannot be actuated by any other motive than the desire of universal empire, and consequently, that England should not allow, as should Italy, or the other oppressed nationalities, lend their hands for exchanging one task-master for another. (Hear, hear.) These are grave considerations, indeed, and here in my brief, plain words to them. It is easy to say, "Use your eyes, and you will see that Russia is a national existence, and that England should not allow anything: action must be combined on a concerted plan, and before that combination can be arrived at, it is necessary that the English nation should be clearly understood by the Government, that whether the battle-field be confined to the Po, or extend to any other portion of the Austrian dominions, you wish England to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, and that you will not tolerate any proxy of subsidy, and that you will not drop the English flag, and the safety of Austria in the Adriatic, the Danube, or on the Cheers, as you would do it for her safety on the Po. (Cheers.) 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that with a couple of hundred thousand men, and a few millions of brave, liberty-loving people may be held in bondage for ages. There are the instances recorded in history of such deliverance from oppression was achieved without foreign assistance. The United States of America had the assistance of despotic France in establishing their independence. [Hear, hear.] Even England never braved as she is, [Hear, hear.] 15,000 Dutch grenadiers, and a Dutch fleet of 500 sail, was with these that William of Orange came to the rescue of her liberties. [Hear, hear.] We Hungarians achieved our independence through foreign assistance, but no foreign intervention. [Hear, hear.] What serious change has come on a sudden over the minds of governments and of aristocrats that they raise a hue and cry against what they call the intervention of the French in Italy? Why, my lord, for about forty years, France has been the cause of anything else but foreign intervention against Italy. France has intervened in Spain, at Naples, in Piedmont, in Sicily, at Rome, in Moldo-Wallachia, in Hungary, in Russia, in Baden, in Schleswig-Holstein—everywhere there has been intervention against liberty, and I do not know that England has ever been heard to forbid such intervention. [Hear, hear.] I have seen native land, England's Government had not even seen poor word of observation to offer. [Hear, hear.] Well, here at last is a case in which a chance of emancipation from the yoke of Austria is presenting itself by an intervention if intervention it be, and a hue and cry is raised against it. I am surprised that England should be so much more ready to be invoked in favor of the oppressed. [Hear, hear.] It is a discreditable hypocrisy. Let Austria be replaced in the position in which the heroic arms of my nation had buried her 1849, before foreign intervention had lifted her up from the dust, and be sure neither Italy nor we shall want any assistance; but let England permit her to be crushed, by foreign intervention, let her not be recorded that, when such intervention might have turned to the advantage of the oppressed nationalities, then only was it opposed for the first time by that England which was so much indebted herself to foreign assistance for her own liberation from oppression. [Hear, hear.] Besides, in this case the exactly intervention—there is war between established governments. That one or more nationalities may take advantage of the opportunity is, I should think, not exactly a proper reason for England to throw, Prussia-like, her sword into the scale against the rights of nations. [Hear, hear.] Wars with the murder of nationalities. [Cheers.] What may be the special motives which induced the present ruler of France to engage in this war I do not pretend to know; but I know what cannot be in his interest, and therefore cannot be in his intention. [Hear, hear.] He is in the interest of the oppressed nations, of a conqueror, because that would be positive ruin to him, as it was the ruin of Napoleon I. Nay, though that great captain was certainly an ambitious man, yet I feel perfectly certain that if he were to rise this day from his grave, with all his high-towering ambition, not even he could enter now on the career of a conqueror. [Hear, hear.] Furthermore, I know that it cannot be in his interest, nay that it is positively against his interest, to aim at the oppression of nationalities. [Cheers.] It is the irreverent disregard of the sentiment of nationality which set Napoleon I. to the fettered eagle on the roching rocks of St. Helena, and this is one of the causes of the sentiment of nationality that will shatter to atoms the tottering throne of perfidious Austria. And verily it does strike me that Napoleon III. is not exactly the man to repeat the fault by which Napoleon I. fell. By doing good to the oppressed nationalities he may earn great popularity, but he will not run the risk of anything but ruin for himself. [Cheers.] In forming my opinion I take for a starting point interests, not men; and knowing that in matters where so much is at stake men are not likely to disregard their interest, I dare trust to the soundness of my conclusions. [Hear, hear.] Suppose I give you as an supposition—suppose that the logical development of the present war should offer to my own nation, not an incitement to hazardous desultory riots—these I should strictly advise her to avoid—but should offer her such a chance as would, with reasonable exertions, give her independence, and within the reach of her own determination, would you advise her to reject the chance because, under the mysterious dispensation of Providence, it would have come to her from a Bonaparte? Why, she would be a fool to reject it. [Cheers.] Hungary cannot afford to be engaged in a war, and to be so near London, and too distant for that; her distance alone places her out of that danger. [Hear, hear.] And even as to Italy. Hated as Austria is by every Italian, the iron rod of Austria was strong enough to prove Italy from organizing and arming the nation. Thanks to the assistance of France, they can do it now. Let them, therefore, be guided by the same policy, and, having aid and assistance in getting delivered from the foe, if they should not know how to secure their future independence from the friend, they would not deserve to be free. [Loud cheers.] When the fate of nations is trembling in the scale, we to the man who, loving himself more than his fatherland, would allow himself to be guided by the opinion of his special sympathy and antipathies rather than by what he owes to his country. I love my fatherland more than myself—more than anything on earth; and, inspired by this love, I ask one boon—only one boon—from England, and that is: that she should not support Austria. [Hear, hear.] I am not a party to her, but I am for the worst of despotism on earth—that of Austria. [Great cheering.] The only boon I ask is strict neutrality; and this, too, I should not ask if I were not certain in my conscience that England's interference in the war would bring incalculable harm to my own country. I am not a party without any present profit or future compensation. [Hear, hear.] I own, and gladly profess to owe, eternal gratitude to England. I should feel it much like a misfortune befalling my own native land should England inconsiderately run her sword into the scale against my own nation, in aid of the House of Austria. [Hear.] The English nation has mighty destinies in her hands. Please to bear well in mind this, that no war can be thought to have assumed European proportions, unless Germany and Russia become parties to it. Now, my lord, I am of opinion that, though the German nation be unconsciously engaged in the war, it is not a party to it. The House of Austria, unless Prussia takes the lead—[Hear, hear.]—thus abjuring the policy of Frederick the Great, which raised her to the position of a first-rate Power. And I, for one, considering the attitude which the Czar has assumed, do not think the Russian nation for one, cannot think the Russian nation will risk the dangerous hazard, unless he should be made sure of being supported by England. This it evidently depends on the resolution of England whether or not this war is to assume general European proportions; because if Prussia, from reliance upon England, should be induced to engage in the war, I am sure that more than reasonable to anticipate that France, in that case, will be supported by Russia. [Hear, hear.] Let, therefore, her Majesty's Government well ponder over the consequences of a rash, inconsiderate step, and let them well weigh the immense responsibility of their position. I am not a party to the war, but I am for the good of my country. Keep your eyes out of harm; develop your own freedom; advance your prosperity; go on steadily on the road of progress, to your own advantage as well as to that of humanity and of civilization; and allow me to express a hope that if, under the aid of God, the English nation should achieve its national emancipation should arise from the present complications for any of the nationalities whom Austria holds in bondage, the good wishes and hearty prayers of this free, generous nation will not be with the oppressor, but will be with the oppressed; that England will not be looking on and doing nothing, but that she will be taking an active part in the struggle, and in encouraging it by her sympathy. [Great and long-continued applause.]

KOSSTH CRITICISED.

From the London Times, May 23.

The present position of the House of Austria has called forth from his retirement one of its bitterest and most consistent enemies. We have given to the public a report of the long and eloquent speech in which M. Kossth comments on the present position of Austria, the policy of England, and the regard to the English alliance which this ex-Governor of Hungary gives advice which this country is very well disposed to take. He bids us stand aloof from the quarrel and observe a strict neutrality. But, though M. Kossth would have us neutral in the quarrel, he is by no means neutral himself. He can see nothing in our policy but weakness, and he bids us to do otherwise. The fight between Liberty and Slavery, between light and darkness, between life and death. Why, then, with views so entirely decisive, with so fervid a conviction of the rights and wrongs of the quarrel, does M. Kossth counsel us to be mere spectators of the game which is being played before our eyes? He bids us to be neutral, and he bids us to be otherwise. The truth is that M. Kossth has come to understand the feelings of the English nation a little better than he did when he first came among us. He has arrived at the conclusion, which we are not able to dispute, that if England were to enter into the struggle, her aid would be of great service to the oppressed nations, and the interests of Hungary to be identified. He fears that our weight would be thrown at all, into the contrary scale, and he feels that he is making the best bargain which circumstances admit of when he urges us to remain steadfast and inexorable in our resolution to support the oppressed, and to look only to the wisdom of the advice which we are giving. He cannot profess to go with M. Kossth in the opinions upon which that advice is supported. Indeed, the extravagance of the orator is in sharp and violent con-

anything to do with it. The Austrians must be expelled from Italy or the Italian nation must be exterminated; there is no room for compromise; and, if you ask M. Kossuth why, he tells you that it is because the Italian question is a question of nationality.

The Italian question is a question of nationality. The Italian question out of the domain of practical politics, places it above all considerations of common sense or practical expediency, and leaves it but one solution—that which shall be in accordance with the national interest in taking lower ground as the basis of her diplomatic efforts in 1818, and Germany is now likely to fall into a similar error because she chooses to look at the matter from the standing point of her own dominions rather than from the standpoint of the Italian nationality. Let us note, therefore, suppose that the object of the present war, as understood by M. Kossuth, is either to improve the moral or material interests of Italy, to lighten her burdens, to unite her people in one State, or to give them any kind of personal, municipal or political freedom. Nothing of the kind. The war is sentimental and patriotic, it is absolutely unpractical. It is the nature of things, that the country south of the Alps should not be profaned by the presence of a people speaking a language with many consonants and few vowels, seeing that it has been reserved by the express order of Providence for a nation speaking a language in which the vowels greatly predominate.

This view is interrupted for the last 300 years, but the principle of rationality is just as independent of prescription as of common sense. But then Austria holds her dominions in Italy under the sanction of the Treaties of 1815! The short answer which M. Kossuth gives us, is that those treaties are in derogation of the principle of nationality. To be sure. To be sure. To be sure. To our view, we do not exactly see what the war-making treaties at all, since, if they affirm the principle of nationality, they are superfluous, and if they are in derogation of it they are void. Lord Wellington says, "It is a pity that the war of the First Napoleon, had it not been for the fact, the best way for us to remain at peace will be to repudiate and eschew them altogether."

M. Kossuth then raises a point which happily it is not at present necessary to decide: What ought to be the course of action of this country if the war should spread here? Should we be a party to these treaties, or should we be our course of action if not merely the Italian Dominions, the actual existence of the Empire of Austria, should be threatened? M. Kossuth can see no difficulty in the matter. The existence of Austria is of no importance whatever to us. Since the war of the First Napoleon, she did not assist us in the war against Russia, but whatever M. Kossuth may think, we cannot regard the existence of such a Power as a matter of indifference, or utterly scorn the action of a balance of power in Europe, which is, after all, only a diplomatic phrase, a policy, a mere expedient. France, for instance, would have no barrier against Persia, for she has a large Slavonic population. Let her sink into the Gulf of Perdition, and there will be no more wars in Europe, no more revolutions, no more necessity for standing armies. Austria once demolished, and her component parts separated, all possibility of future discord will be removed; Italy will resist the encroachments of France, Hungary will form an invincible barrier against Russia, and the hereditary dominions will make a second-rate State in the German Confederation. People have accused France of being avaricious, greedy, aggressive, and ambitious. This is entirely a delusion. France is a lamb, and Russia is a dove, while Austria, enterprising, innovating Austria, is the sword of Damocles hung over the head of Europe—the cavern that feeds the revolutionary volcano. The days of conquest are past. The Third Napoleon has no interest, and therefore no wish, to risk his life in the hands of the Emperor of Russia. He would in three days be a member of the Peace Society. Aggressive war is an anachronism which so great a man would not fall into. Besides, if contrary to all anticipation, the Emperor of the French should not turn out quite disinterested, and were free like if they cannot? At this point, M. Kossuth seems to have some misgiving, for he remarks, in passing, that, whatever happens to Italy, Hungary, at any rate, if emancipated from the House of Austria, is not likely to become a province of France.

There is now, we believe, put our readers pretty well in possession of the political creed which M. Kossuth submits for their adoption. He relieves us from the weight of all existing treaties by way of giving us some sound and reliable basis of political action. He dissuades us from paying any regard to our own rights by the plea that we have no right to be the ruler of other men whom we have any reason to be afraid, and that the Emperor of France and Russia ought not to cause us moment's thought or uneasiness. He knows not what the motives of France are, but they cannot be aggressive. He knows not what are the objects of the Emperor of Russia, but they cannot possibly be hostile. Having thus cleared away every obstacle, he shines forth as a beacon light to our guidance, he displays through the lens of his magic lantern a gorgeous vision of nationalities, and assures us that the only safe course for England is to treat all that she has considered realities as shadows, all that she has hitherto looked on as shadows as realities. We scarcely think that this eminently practical advice yet, and that the Emperor of France, who is tempting, your voyage to the land of dreams. For the present, our resolution is to be neutral. For the future we cannot answer, but we feel quite sure that our conduct will be guided by considerations very different from those which inspire the eloquence of the French politicians, for we shall be guided by teaching, political wisdom, authority, and who have uniformly contrived to extinguish the nationalities of which they are the champions.

THE BATTLE OF MONTEBELLO.

From *The Standard*, 17th May.

At length the two armies which now occupy Piedmont show signs of being about to commit themselves to some decisive conflict, and the plan of operations grows more distinct and continuous in its outline. It was not unnatural that the Austrians should be especially suspicious of the designs of the allied French army, and that they should have been alarmed at the stretched as they now appear to be across the plain of Piedmont, and throwing out flying parties upon all points in their front, partly to levy contributions, but principally, as we believe, to divide the attention of the French main body, and to prevent the Austrian detachment from covering its retreat. The Austrians, indeed, have been and their thoughtless occupation by the condition of Pavia and Genoa. It was upon those points that the advance of the French and Sardinians was most obviously to be dreaded, for Pavia and Piacenza are to the French what Alexandria is to the Austrians. And the French might fight it off, but the French were weak, and the Austrians, upon Turin, leaving Alexandria on their left flank; and Napoleon III. would, in like manner, probably think it imprudent to follow the Austrians, if they should retreat beyond the Ticino, or to occupy Milan, even if the road should be open to him, and the French army could not be opened to him. We can thoroughly understand, therefore, why General Sardinia on Friday last sent out a reconnoitering party of 15,000 men to advance from Stradella on the road to Voghera as far as Casteggio and Montebello. It was important to him to know whether Piacenza was taken, and if so, whether the French were near it.

General Stadion, accordingly upon these points was promptly satisfied. His reconnaissance quickly placed his three brigades in the presence of a large French force, and the result was a second Battle of Montebello, in which the combatants and the fortune of the day were as they had been in the first battle. When the first battle of Montebello was fought, the Austrians held Genoa, and were concentrated under the guns of Alexandria, just as the French now are, while the French held all that plain country which is now the theatre of the operations. On the 17th of May 1860, and the advanced guard of Napoleon's army across the Po at St. Cipriano, and on his arrival at Montebello found himself at the head of 9,000 Frenchmen, and with an army of 15,000 Austrians before him, posted in a fortified position. Here, however, the parallel between the two battles ceases. In the first battle, the French, with his 9,000 men, attacked the Austrians, and continued the unequal battle until the arrival of his supports enabled him to force the position, and to convert an apparently hopeless attack into a decisive victory. The leader of the three brigades detached by General Stadion to occupy the positions of the Austrians, succeeded only in making good his escape across the Po. The accounts that have reached us from Paris, Turin and Vienna do not materially differ in the statement of this first great military event of the war. There was a fierce combat which lasted four hours, during which the town of Casteggio and the village of Montebello were captured by the French. The French, at the break of the division of Gen. Forey which repulsed this attack; but it may be remembered as a coincidence that the force of the attacking Austrians in the battle of Montebello of 1859 was identical with that which defeated the same ground in 1860. The loss of the French amounted to between 600 and 800 men, including Gen. Beuret, Commandant Duclet, and three colonels. That of the Austrians is stated by their bulletin to be "probably about the same" that of the French; but the French account estimates the Austrian loss at 2,000. Thus the victory remained with the French, and the Austrians lost 1,000 men, and the enemy has retreated across the Po at a point below its confluence with the Ticino. The advance of the Austrians

The Austrian evidently fought well, for they must have carried the town of Casteggio, which had been occupied by the French and barricaded, before they could have arrived at the village of Montebello, which was eventually driven. The Austrians seem to have been in the first instance surprised and only to have been driven back through Montebello and Casteggio when the French supports came up. It is claimed on their part that they forced the French to employ the whole of the force at the battle, and that the victory was conducted in perfect order. The result, therefore, is by no means so decisive as that of the battle of 1805, and, as an operation bearing upon the fortunes of the campaign, the achievement of Gen. Forey can bear but a small weight. It is the fact that the French improved and consummated by the genius of the First Napoleon. It is, however, the "first blood" of the war; it is an incident which goes toward creating a prestige, and has its moral influences. Moreover, the first battle of Montebello was closely followed by the victory of Marengo. To meet the details of the campaign, further, is the passage in the *Review*, where the Austrian troops were still in position, and, pushing on to a village called Villata, were attacked by a force which they routed and drove back toward Novara, thus inflicting some loss, capturing some prisoners and obtaining possession of some munitions of war. They have only the statement of the French, and, perhaps, have only the somewhat exaggerated. It may have been little more than an affair of outposts, but the success was again with the French and Sardians.

Napoleon III. has one great advantage which was seldom enjoyed by Napoleon the Great. The sea is open to him, and he is in the South, whereas the Austrian is to him as the railways of France. He can throw his troops at a moment's notice upon any spot on the long Italian coast line, and he can raise insurrections and arm insurgents in a hundred places between Leghorn and Cape Passaro. Of this facility he has not been slow to take advantage. He has sent a force to the object of those corps *separés* the destination of which has been so much debated. The landing of a force at Leghorn can, of course, have no other immediate object than to consolidate and protect the revolutionary action in Tuscany, and to raise Central Italy to the aid of the Emperor. It is, however, very much important even than the Battle at Montebello. If the French occupy Tuscany at all they must do so in force, and the corps now landed at Leghorn must be only the advanced guard of an army strong enough to protect itself and able to take the offensive. To the Austrian military mind, the landing of a force of 20,000 men would be very much complicated their position in Piedmont, and would compel them to fight at the disadvantage of having the broad, swollen Tiber behind them, or else to try another coast with Fortune upon that spot of ill augury, the village of Marengo. To the Austrian military mind, the landing of a force of 20,000 men would be very much complicated their position in Piedmont, and would compel them to fight at the disadvantage of having an unfavorable river in their rear, we apprehend, have greater weight than all the reminiscences of the Consulate, and if the Emperor Napoleon succeed in raising Central Italy and concentrating a strong force of French and Italian troops, the Austrian General will want a battle in the position he now occupies.

The third item of the news contained in this day's paper is quite as significant as those upon which we have already commented. The blockade of Venice and Trieste, which was announced on the 20th, and which the Austrian General was intended, not for Venice, or not for Venice only, but first, and principally, for Trieste, the most important Austrian harbor in the Adriatic. Master of the sea, nothing would have been easier for the Emperor of the French to have cut off the coast of Austria, and to cut off her German provinces from all communication with the countries bordering upon the Mediterranean. Any attack upon Trieste would, however, be considered by the German Confederation as one of those acts which would warrant a declaration of war. The Emperor of the French would not do this, and would be of configuration beyond its present confines. The emission or postponement of a blockade, then, seems to argue that the Emperor of the French has, at least for the present, imposed upon himself a certain moderation in respect of the German provinces of Austria, and that he is taking measures which would bring Germany into the arena on the one side and Russia on the other, and which would ultimately imperil that neutral position which all classes among us are so anxious to maintain for England.

The following is an extract from a letter in the *Constitutionnel*, dated Alexandria, May 21:

"Yesterday, at about midday, the advanced posts of the Piedmontese, who have charge of our lines before Voghera, heard firing in the direction of the little village of Casteggio, and immediately sent word to Gen. Forey. This General, not believing that the firing could be heard by the Austrians (that moment had immediately advanced in the direction of the sound, with about 500 men. Scouts were, however, thrown forward, and these soon ascertained that the enemy was present, 12,000 strong, having with him a detachment of cavalry of two squadrons, and a body of 100 of the rest of his division, and while this order was in course of execution, the 500 men kept the Austrian army in check. The conduct of our soldiers appears at this juncture to have been really admirable. At one time Col. de la Motte was killed with only about 100 of his men, and him, giving orders for firing, and himself taking part in the action most heroically.

"On the arrival of the division the engagement became general. The artillery were not able to work their guns rapidly in consequence of the bad condition of the ground. The Austrians were firing from the heights, and the fire was directed against the main body of the Austrians, two others were carried by our soldiers up on to a rising ground, and swept the plain most beautifully.

"Attacked at close quarters with an extraordinary degree of energy and vigor, the Austrians retired, and our troops pursued them as far as Montebello driving them in confusion, till they were completely routed. Each, however, had to be attacked separately in every street separate engagements took place—nowhere, and for no single moment, did the numerical superiority of the enemy prevail, and as the engagement was directed against the main body of the Austrians, the result was the same; and it is a remarkable fact that, although the Austrians themselves have been the aggressors, they have lost more ground than would probably have been the case if they had wanted to be attacked.

"The Austrians, however, the Austrian side, I am assured that 1,000 of their men have been killed or wounded, and 200 taken prisoners. Among the prisoners is a colonel, wounded, and about 30 officers. As far as relates to material, one caisson only has been taken by our men, and this is, in fact, only an exchange, since we have our own account of the campaign. Against Austria by the announcement: Battle of Montebello, 26th May, 1859, 2,500 against 12,000."

THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN PIEDMONT.

Correspondence of the London Times.

AUSTRIAN HEADQUARTERS, MORTARA, May 16.

No movement of any importance has taken place since the 12th inst. The Austrian army (under the command of the Emperor) has been moved from here about 12 miles further south. I noted carefully the march of this corps, wishing to know exactly what space it occupied on a road, and what time was necessary to put it in motion, so as to be able to explain why an army cannot move as fast as it is often represented to do. The advanced guard passed my point of observation at 8.5 a. m., and from that time till 12.35 the storm of infantry, cavalry, artillery and military train moved past without intermission. Five hours, all but ten minutes! So you see my estimate of ten or twelve miles of road for such a corps must be within the truth. The march of the Austrian army is a very slow one. Of course, for a sudden dash the infantry, cavalry and even a few guns, could be sent 30 or 35 miles a day, and to rush on Novli with two or three such light columns was the original intention of the Austrians. This intention they abandoned when Lord Malinsbury asked them to leave the road to Turin, and to take the road to the sea. The march of the Austrian army is a very slow one. Of course, for a sudden dash the infantry, cavalry and even a few guns, could be sent 30 or 35 miles a day, and to rush on Novli with two or three such light columns was the original intention of the Austrians. This intention they abandoned when Lord Malinsbury asked them to leave the road to Turin, and to take the road to the sea. The march of the Austrian army is a very slow one. Of course, for a sudden dash the infantry, cavalry and even a few guns, could be sent 30 or 35 miles a day, and to rush on Novli with two or three such light columns was the original intention of the Austrians. This intention they abandoned when Lord Malinsbury asked them to leave the road to Turin, and to take the road to the sea. The march of the Austrian army is a very slow one. 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